This paper offers recommendations for how the design of labor income taxes should change during recessions, based on a simple model of a recessionary economy in which jobs are rationed and some employees value working more than others do. The paper draws two counter-intuitive conclusions for maximizing social welfare. First, subsidize non-employment. This draws marginal workers out of the labor force, creating "space" for those who really need jobs. Second, subsidize employers for hiring, not the employees themselves. The problem during recessions is having too few jobs; subsidizing employers creates more jobs, while subsidizing employees confers benefits on those who already won the job lottery. Tax policy in the recent recession has done a poor job of following these recommendations.
Introduction
In response to the Great Recession, the federal government has spent hundreds of billions of dollars in tax and other interventions in the labor market as part of the "stimulus" and follow-up policies. Policy-makers have traditionally based their policies on "Keynesian" theories that recessions are driven by inadequate demand, so that increasing government spending will increase demand for economic activity and workers.
2 However, these theories guide how much to spend, not how to design the spending. As a result, despite this massive outlay of funds, the theory for the form that labor income taxes and related policies should change during recessions is surprisingly poorly-developed.
Instead of drawing on Keynesian macroeconomic theories, I draw on the microeconomics literature on how labor markets function during recessions-in particular, the literature on matching unemployed workers with firms. 3 Insights from microeconomics help answer why there are "two few" jobs and which workers gain employment.
The paper draws two conclusions for maximizing social welfare. First, subsidize nonemployment. This draws marginal workers out of the labor force, creating "space" for those who really need jobs. Second, subsidize employers for hiring, not the employees themselves. The problem during recessions is having too few jobs; subsidizing employers creates more jobs, while subsidizing employees confers benefits on those who already won the job lottery. Unfortunately, policy during and after the Great Recession has done a poor job of following these policies, possibly helping generate some of the political backlash to stimulus programs.
I base these recommendations upon a novel model of the recession economy which has two key features. First, jobs are rationed during recessions. That is, the number of people willing to work substantially exceeds the number of jobs available. Many economists believe that the job rationing comes from the fact wages fall little in recessions, generating more people who wish to work than jobs to employ them. 4 Whatever the cause, high unemployment itself means that jobs must be rationed.
Second, there is good reason to think that there is a substantial amount of randomness in how jobs are rationed. That is, some people really value having a job, and others do not, and there are likely insufficient mechanisms in place to ensure that the high-surplus type of worker receives the job over the low-surplus type of worker. 5 For example, an individual with a mortgage to pay, a non-working spouse, and three children may really need a job; this would be a high-surplus worker. 6 If rationing is 4 Economists believe that jobs are rationed because wages do not fall during recessions, even though demand for workers falls, generating more workers willing to work than employers wish to employ. For economics papers arguing why rationing is an important feature of recessionary economies because wages do not change quickly enough to stop the rationing, see TRUMAN BEWLEY WHY WAGES DON'T FALL DURING A RECESSION (1999) (suggesting, based upon interviews with workers and management, that workers strongly dislike decreases in their "nominal"-that is, non-inflation-adjustedwage and that these decreases would decrease moral and therefore productivity) and John Taylor, Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 37 (1979) (with wage stickiness, both upward and downward, resulting from the fact that firms cannot fully adjust its wages if its competitors are not adjusting theirs at the same time because of staggered wage-setting). Bewley's work builds in part on that of George Akerlof, Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 543 (1982) (suggesting that norms may matter in wage-setting). For recent prominent macroeconomic models which include these "wage rigidities," (1999) (studying the implications of heterogeneous worker surplus on "equilibrium wage dispersion," that is how wages for similar jobs vary). 6 There are many reasons that individuals may vary in their surplus from work. For example, some may particularly fear long-term earnings losses due to long-term unemployment resulting from being unemployed (related to "hysteresis," or increased unemployment resulting from prolonged periods of unemployment during economic shocks These two features of the recessionary economy generate the two policy recommendations.
Likewise, with randomness in rationing, one key concern is ensuring that the right type of person receives the jobs, generating the first recommendation of subsidizing non-employment to encourage marginal workers to leave the labor force and create "space" for high-valuation workers. Likewise, with rationing, another key concern is creating more jobs, not subsidizing existing workers, generating the second recommendation of subsidizing employers for employing workers, not the employees themselves. To my knowledge, asking how taxes should change during recessions with either of these assumptions, let alone both, is new to the tax literature.
I then argue that limitations of the model do not substantially affect the policy recommendations. In particular, this microeconomic model does not consider Keynesian macroeconomic goal of increasing aggregate demand. However, the best estimates of the macroeconomic stimulus of the relevant policies suggests that the policies recommended in this paper are actually some of the best for macroeconomic stimulus, so there is not a tension between the recommendations of microeconomics and microeconomics. Finally, the paper reviews the recent experience of labor market "taxes" in response to the Great Recession in light of the arguments presented here. The first recommendation-of subsidizing non-employment-has been followed by Congress. However, despite interest in policies consistent with this paper, the second recommendation-of subsidizing employers, not employees-has largely not been followed. To the contrary, a policy commonly-used during this and other recessions is employee-side payroll tax rebates, draws marginal workers into the labor force, decreasing social welfare by encouraging people who value work relatively little to join the competition for a fixed number of jobs that would otherwise have been sought only by people who more highly value working.
Contribution to Existing Literature
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, this paper contributes to the renewed interest in how taxes and spending should change during recessions, in light of the aftermath of the Great Recession. Prominent economists have noted that research in this area is sorely needed.
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Lawyers have started the project of understanding how tax laws should change during recessions. In particular, Yair Listokin makes a forceful argument that the lack of macroeconomic considerations in tax law is quite problematic. 9 Others have begun understanding how features of the tax code, like the Alternative Minimum Tax, soften the blow of recessions and how they could do an even better job of serving that goal. 10 Others have considered how unemployment insurance should vary over the business cycle. 11 This is the first paper which considers the implications of efficient and inefficient job rationing on the choice between subsidizing employers, employees, and non-employment.
Second, this paper is part of a broader reassessment of the implications for tax law when traditional assumptions on the invariance of statutory incidence for economic incidence do not hold. Workers have identical productivity but heterogeneous surplus from work (the difference between the actual wage level and the lowest wage level at which an individual is willing to work, which is known as the "reservation wage").
Suppose that, because a recession has just begun and wages are sticky, the wage level is some amount θ greater than the efficient market-clearing price (P* 20 Glaeser & Luttmer, supra note 17. 21 As noted above, this assumption is common in the economics literature. It is also supported by the interviews conducted by BEWLEY, supra note 4 at 241-243 (noting that no companies offered "choice between layoff and continued work on the same job at lower pay" and "[m]ost managers were astonished by the idea of offering as an alternative to layoff continued work on the same job at reduced pay."). As more time passes after the beginning of the recession and wages have time to adjust, the wage rigidities which motivate this paper become less relevant-and, therefore, so do its implications. I assume that workers can be rationed into jobs either efficiently or uniformly. Under "efficient rationing," the workers who value the job the most receive it. Under "uniform rationing,"
all workers who are willing to work at the prevailing wage have an equal probability of receiving the job. While the assumption of uniform rationing may seem extreme, it strikes seems a reasonable case to consider because firms presumably care primarily about productivity. In the absence of any pricebased incentive (or ability) for firms to distinguish between workers with higher and lower reservation wages, there may be little reason that firms would draw such distinctions. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a Coasian bargain being struck between high-surplus unemployed individuals and low-surplus employed ones as such a bargain would have to involve the potential employers. How efficient rationing is likely to be is explored further below.
Finally, suppose that welfare can be measured by taking the area between the labor demand and supply curves, thereby adding up the employer and employee surplus. 
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To gain insight into this result, I turn to graphical representations of the DWL in the two rationing regimes. Figure 2 shows the DWL in the case of efficient rationing. The deadweight loss is represented by ABC, the area between the supply and demand curves for workers who would work at quantity Q* at the market-clearing wage but not at the sticky wage. Area ABC is a standard a
Harberger triangle, the familiar way of measuring DWL in economics.
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I call this triangle the "quantity DWL."
Uniform rationing results in the same quantity DWL plus an additional DWL resulting from the misallocation of workers to jobs. I call this additional DWL the "allocative DWL," and it is
represented by area CDEF in Figure 3 . In the efficient rationing case, the worker surplus is the area from the wage to the supply curve. In the uniform case, the worker surplus only constitutes the area Furthermore, the concern here about rationing efficiency is not a trivial one. Quite to the contrary, for small amounts of wage stickiness, the main problem is not that there are too few jobs, 29 Technically, the DWL is first-order in θ for uniform rationing and second-order in θ for efficient rationing. See infra note 34 for an explanation of "first-order" and "second-order." Employee surplus resulting in quantity DWL, but rather that the wrong workers are in the jobs that exist. 30 The intuition is simple: suppose that there is just a small amount of rationing, such that there is only one excess worker. The quantity deadweight loss is tiny (indeed, infinitesimally small); that worker was close to the margin of working anyways, so there is very little loss to him or his employer from his not being able to work. But if rationing is uniform, then the one worker who cannot find a job may be one who really needed the job-indeed, on average, it will be the willing worker with the average surplus from working as shown in Figure 3 . The loss to this worker is very large.
Optimal Government Policy
Here I consider two labor market policies that can help alleviate the DWL during recessions.
For simplicity I assume that all government policy is financed by non-distortionary lump-sum taxes.
A. Recommendation 1: Subsidize Non-Employment
The first result from this set-up is:
P2: In the case of uniform rationing, a subsidy for non-employment causes a large welfare gain. under efficient rationing ) = ∞ . That is, the limit as θ approaches 0 of the ratio of 1) the extra DWL from uniform rationing relative to efficient rationing and 2) the DWL from efficient rationing alone is infinite. For small amounts of rationing, all that matters is the inefficient rationing, not the jobs shortage. 31 In particular, for subsidy W, the welfare gain is 
)) * . The welfare gain is "large" in the sense of being a "first-order" welfare gain; that is, W appears in the equation without being multiplied by itself. Since economic welfare analysis is done "on the margin" (i.e., for the first infinitesimally small unit of W) and when W is less than 1, multiplying W by itself (i.e., a "second-order" welfare gain) yields a product less than W itself, the welfare gain is considered large for first-order welfare gains. An additional technical (and sensible) assumption for the marginal welfare gain to be positive is that the subsidy is not so gigantic that it reduces the number of workers willing to work to less than Q D , the level of employment with no intervention.
shifts up since having a job is relatively less valuable. Under efficient rationing this policy has no impact on DWL. Regardless of the subsidy, the individuals gaining the most from the job are employed. However, with uniform rationing and no subsidy, many employed workers receive little surplus from their employment. A subsidy for non-employment induces those with the least surplus to exit the labor force, creating "space" for workers with a higher surplus from work. With uniform rationing there is an obvious welfare-enhancing trade to be made: people who value working highly but who were not hired should pay those who value working only a small amount but who were hired to give up their jobs. A subsidy for non-employment mimics this payment system.
A corollary of the result that subsidizing non-employment increases social welfare is that policies that discourage marginal individuals from seeking work and competing with those who really need jobs are also beneficial. So policy-makers should consider making it easier for individuals to stay eligible for social insurance programs rather than returning to jobs that they do not wish to take. For example, federal regulations provide that a jobless worker collecting unemployment insurance must search for work, but may limit his search to jobs that constitute "suitable work." 32 If an unemployed worker refuses to accept "suitable work" without suitable cause, he loses unemployment insurance benefits. The surplus of jobs and presence of some workers who want them more than others suggest that, during recessions, suitable work standards should be weakened-that is, the definition of work that is considered "suitable" should be narrowed. to pursue and accept jobs that they do not want very much just to maintain their unemployment insurance, making both the individual not forced to take the job and the individual who actually gets the job better off. Another condition of eligibility for unemployment insurance is the "prevailing conditions" test, allowing unemployment insurance recipients to refuse jobs that fall below prevailing market conditions as determined by the overall labor market, rather than worker's own skills as for the suitable work requirements. 33 Weakening this test during recessions would also help ensure that those who most need jobs receive them. Similar reasoning applies to social insurance programs from supplemental income for food to health care: during recessions, eligibility should be expanded so that unemployed individuals need not seek out and accept jobs that they value little when there are many others who highly value those jobs.
B. Recommendation 2: Subsidize Employers for Hiring, Not the Employees i. Subsidizing Employers is Welfare-Increasing
Second, consider a subsidy which pays employers for each of the employees that they employ and the following result:
P3: In rationed labor markets, a hiring subsidy for employers increases welfare.
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As shown in Figure 5 , suppose that the subsidy increases labor demand to Demand2. Because of the subsidy, employers hire more workers, and the quantity DWL shrinks from the large area ABC in ). Put another way, for large employer-side subsidies, in which the marginal dollar in employer subsidy causes little decrease in quantity DWL, a marginal increase in the subsidy can increase total DWL, so employer subsidies should be set below this point. Essentially, a key problem in rationed labor markets is that employers provide too few jobs.
Subsidizing employers to hire more workers alleviates this problem. Because sticky wages cause employers to pay "too much" for workers, the fact that the subsidy goes to employers, not employees, is key, since the subsidies reduce the wage that employers pay. If the subsidy had gone to workers, there would have been no decline in the amount that employers had to pay their workers.
Although the analysis in this paper generally assumes that rationing is uniform, note that this result does not depend upon the efficiency of the rationing, since the gain in efficiency comes from quantity DWL, not allocative DWL. Quantity DWL is the same under either type of rationing. Rather, subsidizing employers can actually be less valuable under uniform rationing than under efficient rationing. The reason is that, with uniform rationing, the allocative inefficiency (area C"D"EF) grows with the subsidy in some cases, as shown in Figure 5 , with the extension of allocative DWL to the right even as quantity DWL shrinks to the right. 35 The rationale is simple: although more workers are employed, some of those gaining employment do not value their jobs very much, increasing allocative inefficiency. In other words, some of the loss in quantity DWL is "taken back" by an increase in allocative DWL. Nevertheless, under either form of rationing, an employer subsidy is a welfareimproving policy.
ii. Subsidizing Employees is Welfare-Decreasing
Now consider a subsidy for employees, instead of employers. This is exactly the opposite of Recommendation 1, subsidizing non-employment, since subsidies for employees make nonemployment less attractive, not more attractive. This yields the following proposition:
P4: In the case of uniform rationing, a subsidy for employees decreases welfare.
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When considering a subsidy for employees, the analysis in Figure 4 for subsidizing non-employment reverses. When workers decide whether to enter the labor market, they compare their utility from entering the labor market with their utility from exiting the labor market. Thus, this policy draws more marginal workers into the labor force, by making working more attractive. However, it does not increase the number of jobs, like subsidizing employers. These marginal workers then compete with workers who really need jobs, the opposite of what happens with the subsidy for nonemployment. The presence in the labor market of workers who care only a little about working makes it less likely that those who really want to work will get hired at one of a fixed number of jobs. 35 In particular, when the average reservation wage of workers willing to work is greater than that of the worker who would be rationed into employment under efficient rationing (the employee at Q2 D along the supply curve), a marginal increase in the subsidy increases allocative DWL. 36 Thus, the welfare loss from subsidizing an employee is simply the negative of the welfare gain from subsidizing nonemployment. See the results in supra note 31. Therefore, these tax cuts are counterproductive with uniform rationing as they aggravate the allocative DWL without reducing the quantity DWL. 37 This result of subsidizing employers instead of employees resonates with the political debate during the recession on the importance of "creating" more jobs;
the focus was not on helping out workers who already were lucky enough to have jobs.
C. Implementation
The two policies recommended here-subsidizing non-employment and subsidizing employers during recessions-could be enacted in at least two ways. 37 Instead of subsidizing employees, the model actually implies that it is desirable to increase taxes on employees. Of course, raising taxes during recessions is a bad idea for macroeconomic reasons. If it were wise, though, taxing employees and subsidizing employers would effectively reduce the post-tax wage, removing the underlying source of inefficiency and therefore reducing both allocative and quantity DWLs. Although the market will not get the wage down, the government can effectively decrease it. Such a policy is an alternative to inflation when the Federal Reserve already has interest rates as low as they can go, which happened in the most recent recession. 38 Congress could partially respond to the concern about employers' strategic behavior by promising during its deliberations to make the subsidy retroactive.
How Efficient is Rationing?
In this section, I argue that it is reasonable to think that job rationing during recessions is inefficient. 39 To understand how efficient rationing is during recessions, one must consider the two main sources of unemployment-layoffs and lack of hiring. 40 Each can potentially have a different mechanism which bears on the efficiency of rationing. I will review each type in turn.
First, evidence suggests that how much workers value the job is not a criterion considered by firms in making layoff decisions. In particular, when Yale economist Truman Bewley interviewed firms about their layoff decisions, there was no evidence at all that this was a concern. 41 This apparent indifference makes sense because firms care about productivity, not worker surplus from work.
Indeed, evidence from Bewley and others confirms that productivity is an important criterion when considering whom to lay off. 42 As well, even if firms did care, it would be difficult for them to distinguish between workers with high and low surplus from work; presumably, many workers would profess having a high surplus in order to help them keep their jobs. 43 Furthermore, in some cases, firms do not even choose individual workers to layoff and instead lay off whole divisions or close entire plants. In those cases, of course there can be no attention paid to worker surplus. Indeed, Bewley concludes, "Despite the widespread use of the performance criterion, the population of unemployed was probably not of low quality, for many firms laid off whole departments or large 39 Measuring rationing efficiency is particularly challenging given the unobservability of surplus from work. One approach to measuring surplus from work is using the amount that individuals say that they value working (as in Martin Feldstein & James Poterba, Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wages, 23 J. PUB. ECON. 141 (1984)); however, economists tend to be skeptical of such stated values, versus those that are revealed by individuals' behavior. 40 In principle, people who quit but do not find employment could also be a part of unemployment. However, evidence shows that the number of people quitting jobs actually went down substantially during the recession, so quits are unlikely to play an important role in cyclical unemployment. In contrast, layoffs increased substantially and the number of job opening and amount of hiring plummeted, making it harder to find jobs. See Job Opening and Labor Turnover Point to (Slow) Recovery, http://econompicdata.blogspot.com/2011/11/job-opening-and-labor-turnover-point-to.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 41 BEWLEY, supra note 4, at 238-242. 42 See, e.g., Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, Layoffs and Lemons, 9 J. LABOR ECON. 351 (1991) (confirming empirical predictions of a model in which low-productivity workers are laid off when firms do not close whole plants and therefore have discretion over layoffs). 43 Of course, family circumstances and other things may be observed, but these are likely to be crude proxies.
portions of them." 44 Thus, the best evidence suggests that, on the layoff side, employer behavior does not undermine the assumption of uniform rationing; firms lay off whole plants or divisions or they pay attention to productivity, not worker surplus.
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Evidence from the hiring side also suggests that inefficient rationing may be rampant. As with layoffs, there is no evidence that firms considered workers' surplus in hiring. Bewley's research reveals no attempt to hire those with higher surplus from work. 46 But there is a second side to hiring-worker effort into getting hired. Likely, the ability of workers who have a higher surplus from employment to work hard at getting a job partly undoes part of what otherwise might be inefficient rationing.
However, the evidence from Bewley and others suggests that even significant search effort or flexibility by the unemployed often did not yield a job during a recession. 47 Indeed, though not framed as inefficient job rationing, the kind of luck that generates inefficient rationing is implicit in a great deal of economic modeling on how workers search for jobs.
Although these models range from quite simple 48 to very complex, 49 all recognize that in finding (and often losing) a job, there is an element of chance. Plants close, interviews go poorly, unlucky social networks of friends, and stochastic rapport between interviewer and firm all cause otherwise identical individuals to face different outcomes in the labor market. In fact, there is a large empirical literature 44 BEWLEY, supra note 4, at 238. 45 Some firms also lay off in reverse seniority, which also is unlikely to closely correspond to workers surplus from work. Id. 46 BEWLEY, supra note 4, at Chp. 15. 47 BEWLEY, supra note 4 at 341 ("I asked whether people could find work quickly if they were sufficiently flexible and energetic in their job search. The answer was usually an emphatic 'no.' Respondents claimed that the general shortage of jobs and the overqualification problem made finding a job of any time a long, difficult process, though some job hunters were lucky. The shortage of jobs relative to the number of job seekers preoccupied advisers of the unemployed. . . . All but one of these 18 said it normally took a long time to find work, even if job searchers were energetic and completely Thus, implicitly assuming efficient rationing helps lead to results which seem wrong.
One potential critique of the existence of inefficient rationing is that workers and employers should take advantage of the Coase theorem to arrive a mutually-beneficial bargain. For example, among similar workers, those with high surplus could pay workers with low surplus to resign, "leaving a space" for the high-surplus worker in the face of layoffs. Or an unemployed high-surplus individual could pay an unemployed low-surplus individual not to apply for a rationed job. That is, it may be difficult to coordinate side-payments.
Considerations Outside of the Model Generally Support the Main Conclusions
The model developed in this paper is, of course, limited by its assumptions. However, even looking outside the model, other considerations are generally supportive of the paper's conclusions.
One important consideration outside of this model is the policy's effect on aggregate demand. 54 In particular, one might be concerned that subsidizing employers instead of employees would put money in the hands of those who are less likely to spend it (i.e., they have a lower "marginal propensity to consume"), resulting in less spending and therefore less aggregate demand, harming economic recovery. Fortunately, the best evidence suggests that the growth effects of the policies recommended here are also policies with large effects on aggregate demand. 55 In particular, among the thirteen options considered by the Congressional Budget Office for increasing economic growth, the two with the largest impact on GDP per dollar of spending were increasing aid to the unemployed (expected to increase GDP by $1.15 per dollar of spending), a form of subsidizing non-employment, and reducing employers' payroll taxes (expected to increase GDP by $0.75 per dollar of spending), a hiring subsidy for employers. Reducing employees' payroll taxes, thereby subsidizing employment on the employee side, was expected to have a smaller impact, at $0.50 per dollar of spending. 56 Thus, the concern that increasing employment and making sure that the right employees are employed would harm economic growth appears to be unfounded based on the best available evidence.
The so-called "social costs of queueing" is a second factor not considered in the preceding analysis; it bolsters the first policy recommendation of subsidizing non-employment. 57 Suppose that when jobs are over-subscribed, anyone who wishes to gain employment must participate in a lottery and pay some fixed cost like waiting in line, interviewing, or mailing applications. On the one hand, these costs can decrease DWL by ensuring that extremely marginal individuals do not bother applying.
On the other hand, the more people spending time applying for a fixed number of jobs, the more social waste results from the queueing process. A program to subsidize non-employment through unemployment or welfare payments could reduce these costs by reducing the extent to which jobs are over-subscribed; as such, the above analysis may actually understate the value of non-employment subsidies.
A third relevant factor not considered in the model is the distortion to behavior which results from the government's need to raise funds to pay for government programs. Of course, this factor does not alter the recommendation of subsidizing firms instead of workers. However, it does affect the value of subsidizing non-employment. 58 In particular, if I added considerations of the costs of taxation, the cost of subsidizing employers and non-employment would be understated.
Of course, the model used in this paper ignores other potentially important considerations, wage; to the extent that workers' wages respond to the reservation wage, fall in a recession, or change with subsidies, the results will be less relevant.
Assessment of Policies during the Recent Downturn
A. Congress Has Subsidized Non-Employment
The first policy recommendation that I make is that effective subsidies on the non-employed should go up during recessions. Congress has followed this recommendation. Most importantly,
Congress has repeatedly extended increases in the generosity of unemployment insurance. 60 At an estimated cost of $39 billion, the approximately $800 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (also known as the Obama stimulus or "the Recovery Act") increased weekly unemployment payouts by $25, suspended income taxation on the first $2,400 of benefits in 2009, and extended the duration of unemployment insurance by 13 weeks. 61 Benefits similar to these were extended through shortly before the end of 2013. 62 Evidence suggests that these unemployment extensions did, indeed, keep people out of the labor force.
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The Recovery Act included many other provisions effectively subsidizing non-employment as well. First, Act increased the subsidies for health insurance through former employers for the unemployed (known as "COBRA") 64 , at an estimated cost of $25 billion. 65 The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program and other expenditures to pay for food for very low-income or unemployed individuals were also expanded, at a cost of over $20 billion. 66 This provision makes it easy to have no income and in fact requires that as a condition. Likewise, the Recovery Act included funding for states to maintain their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families payments (the program after the mid-1990s "welfare reform"), estimated at a cost of $18.5 billion. 67 Finally, the Act provided an estimated $88 billion in funding for state governments, conditioned on their maintaining the standards in Medicaid, the program which provides health care to low-income individuals, many of whom are not employed. The credit was available up to 6.2% of earned income and phased out for high-income tax payers. 74 The credit was estimated to cost $116.2 billion, about ten times the estimated cost of the HIRE Act. The uniformity assumption gives rise to linear aggregate supply and demand curves. Labor demand is therefore is given by
1 For variables related to workers (labor suppliers), we use the abbreviation S. For variables related to employers (labor demanders), we use the abbreviation D. As will become clear below, the variables b S and b D refer to the intercepts of the labor supply and demand curves, while the variables m S and m D refer to the slope of the labor supply and demand curves.
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Similarly, labor supply is also linear and given by
I make several innocuous parametric assumptions: In a free market equilibrium, I have demand equal to supply. This implies that
Plugging in the equilibrium price to the supply curve, I have
The social surplus is the area between the supply and demand curves. In general this would be
Here, the form is especially easy because it is a triangle. The social surplus in the free market economy
The above results applied to a free market ‡exible price equilibrium. For the remainder of the Appendix, I assume that wages are sticky, so that actual wages P A = P + ; for 0 :
Results

Proposition 1: DWL from Uniform Rationing
The DWL from e¢ cient rationing is second-order in and is given by
To determine how much labor is demanded at P A , I use the labor demand equation. I denote this quantity Q D :
I then solve for the price that would cause the labor supplied to be equal to Q D :
The DWL associated with the sticky wages is given by the standard Harber triangle bounded b the demand curve, the supply curve, and the quantity demanded at P + . The DWL is therefore equal to: 
The DWL from uniform rationing is …rst-order in and is given by
To determine the DWL, I calculate the surplus of the employers and the workers under this system and subtract from the free market case. Employer surplus is given by the triangle under the demand 4 curve and above the sticky wage, P + . The triangle has a height of b D (P + ) and a base of
Second, I …nd welfare for the employees. The employee surplus is more complicated to compute.
If every worker who wanted a job were hired, the surplus would be given by the triangle given by the points (in (Q; P ) space) (0; b S ), (0; P + ) ; and Q S ; P + . To solve for Q S ; the measure of workers that would want to work at the binding minimum wage, I use the supply curve.
The area of this triangle de…ned by (0; b S ), (0; P + ) ; and Q S ; P + is
However, since the measure of …rms that would like to hire a worker at the price P + is Q D and the measure of workers willing to work is Q S , with the uniform rationing, each worker would would like 5 to work is employed with probability Q D Q S : Hence the employee surplus is given by
To calculate the DWL, I …rst …nd the total social surplus, which is the sum of the employee and employer surplus. It is therefore
DWL is therefore the di¤erence between the total surplus in the free market case and here.
The DWL from uniform rationing is strictly higher than that the DWL from e¢ cient rationing, all 2 (0; max ), where max is de…ned below :
First, I restrict to cases in which the sticky wage is not so high that the market evaporates or so low that there is in fact no sticky wage. This is equivalent to stipulating that 2 0; 
First note that, DW L (0) = DW L ( max ) = 0: Next …nd:
Recall that m D ; m S > 0 by assumption (the demand and supply curves must slope the correct way). Hence we know that DW L 00 ( ) < 0; DW L ( ) is strictly concave. Since DW L (0) = DW L ( max ) = 0; and since the function is strictly concave, we know that DW L ( ) > 0 for all 2 (0; max ) :
Proposition 2: Subsidy for Non-Employment
First consider a subsidy for non-employment. Suppose that the government gives a subsidy of W to an individual if and only if he does not work. Suppose that W is not so large so as to make the quantity of workers willing to supply labor less than Q D : That is, the subsidy does not in ‡uence the 7 measure of employed workers.
To …nd the total surplus, I need to add together the employer surplus and employee surplus, as above. Note that the utility of workers is una¤ected by the fact that non-employment is subsidized, so the lump-sum transfer to the non-employed does not factor directly into the welfare calculations.
Since employer surplus is unchanged, I only need to calculate employee surplus.
To do this, note that the surplus is the measure of workers who are employed times their average surplus. The measure of employees is Q D , and the average surplus is the average surplus of workers willing to work up to Q S 2 (see Figure 4 ): Given the uniform sorting, this surplus is the average of P + b S (the largest surplus) and P + P For comparison, …nd the employee surplus without W using the same method. Note that this is just the quantity supplied times the average reservation wage, which is in turn, the average between 1) the surplus of the highest-reservation-wage individual and 2) the surplues of the lowest surplus individual who is employed (0):
Thus, the di¤erence is: To …nd Q D 2 , substitute P + into Demand 2 :
Next, …nd the employee surplus, which equals the measure employees times the average surplus (which is the same as the case without W ):
The transfer then equals the measure employed times the size of the transfer, W . Thus, total welfare with W is However, note that a marginal increase in the subsidy can lead to a marginal increase in DWL when W is large:
> 0 if and only if W < P + b S 2 which means that the subsidy is not greater than half the surplus of the highest-surplus worker (P + b S ).
Proposition 4: Subsidy for Employees
Now, consider the case in which there is a subsidy employees. In this case, the total surplus is the sum of employer surplus, employee surplus, and the transfer from workers to the government. However, note that, given the money metric utility, total welfare is the same if the government and if the workers have it. Thus, given that this is just the reverse of the non-employment subsidy case, the change in total surplus is just the opposite of the non-employment subsidy case.
